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JURISDICTION 
This Court granted Plaintiffs Petition for Permission to Appeal the June 20, 2008 
Order of the Third Judicial District Court granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare 
Corp. d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent 
Credentialing. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 78A-
3-102(3)(j) (West 2008). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, but should be upheld 
where "it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief 
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their 
claim;' Prows v. Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs "negligent credentialing" 
claim is precluded by the plain language of U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-5, 58-13-4, 26-25-1, 
and 26-25-3 that: 
• immunizes hospitals and hospital committees from liability arising from review of 
"a health care provider's professional ethics, [and] medical competence" (§ 58-13-
5); 
• immunizes hospitals and hospital committees from liability with respect to 
"deliberations, decisions, or determinations" made in good faith and without 
malice for the purpose of "evaluating] and improving] the quality of health care" 
1 
or "evaluating] or reviewing] the diagnoses or treatment of, or the performance 
of health or hospital services to, patients within this state" (§ 58-13-4); 
• bars discovery or use in evidence of "[a] 11 information, interviews, reports, 
statements, memoranda, and other data" provided to a hospital peer review 
committee or any other hospital in-house staff committee for the purpose of 
evaluating and improving hospital care (§ 26-25-3), and immunizing any person or 
hospital who provides such information to such committees (§ 26-25-1)? 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 §§ 26-25-1, 26-25-3, 58-13-4, and 58-13-5, are attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the June 20, 2008 Order of Judge Pat B. Brian, Third 
Judicial District Court, granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp. d/b/a St. 
Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent Credentialing. 
Specifically, the district court found that U.C.A. 1953 § 58-13-5(7) ^clearly insulates a 
hospital from negligence claims stemming from credentialing," by its express language 
that aany hospital, other health care entity, or professional organization conducting or 
sponsoring the review [is] immune from liability arising from participation in a review of 
a health care provider's . . . 'medical competence.'" June 20, 2008 Ruling and Order, at 
1. Citing the Fourth Judicial District Court's decision in Rosenlund v. Mountain View 
Hospital, Inc., Case No. 030400671, Judge Brian stated that ^section 58-13-5(7)'s 
language is ctoo apparent to be ignored . . . and appears to both contemplate and deny the 
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possibility of bringing a negligent credentialing cause of action,"' June 20, 2008 Ruling 
and Order, at 1, Like other district courts who have ruled on this issue1, Judge Brian 
further held that negligent credentialing claims are also barred by ~the broad immunities" 
granted to hospitals in U.C.A. 1953 § 58-13-4 and § 26-25-1. Id. 
On July 8, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal the June 20, 
2008 Interlocutory Order ("Petition") in this Court. On August 6, 2008, this Court 
granted Plaintiffs Petition. (R. at 325). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff Tina Archuleta filed an amended complaint 
alleging negligence and damages arising out of the medical care provided by Defendant 
physicians R. Chad Halverson, M.D. and Steven Simper, M.D. while she was admitted to 
St. Mark's Hospital ("St. MarkV) on or about August 4, 2005. Ms. Archuleta had been 
a patient of Dr. Halverson long before her admission to St. Mark's. (R. at 286). On July 
26, 2005, Dr. Halverson diagnosed Ms. Archuleta as suffering from bile gastritis. At that 
time, Dr. Halverson recommended Ms, Archuleta undergo an exploratory laparotomy and 
roux limb revision at St. Mark's on August 4, 2005. In addition to her allegations of 
1
 At least three other district courts have found that Utah law does not recognize a cause 
of action for negligent credentialing. See Cuno v. G. Remington Brooks, M.D,, Case No. 
050911340, Martinez v. James Tran, M.D. and IHC Health Services, Inc., Case No. 
050400432 MP and Rosenlund v. Mountain View Hospital, Inc., Case No. 030400671, 
attached as Addendum B. 
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medical negligence arising out of her planned August 4, 2005 exploratory laparotomy, 
roux limb revision and subsequent treatment, Plaintiff also alleged a negligent 
credentialing claim against St. Mark's for granting staff privileges to Drs. Simper2 and 
Halverson. More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that %cSt. Mark's failed to seek consult 
when appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently 
credentialed Drs. Simper and Halverson and generally fell below the standard of care 
with regard to Plaintiff Tina Archuleta." As a result of this alleged negligence, plaintiff 
alleges she was injured and suffered damages. (R. at 12). 
On December 17, 2007, St. Mark's simultaneously filed its Answer to Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent 
Credentialing. (R. at 205-217). It its Motion to Dismiss, St. Mark's argued that 
Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims should be dismissed because Utah law does not 
recognize a claim for negligent credentialing and/or privileging. In support of its Motion, 
St. Mark's attached the decisions of the three previously mentioned Utah district courts 
that recently dismissed pending negligent credentialing claims. Each of these courts 
found that negligent credentialing was not cognizable under Utah law, and was further 
precluded by U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-5, 58-13-4, and/or 26-25-1. 
Dr. Simper was subsequently dismissed and his conduct and credentialing are no longer 
at issue. 
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On June 20, 2008, Judge Pat Brian issued a ruling and order granting St. Mark's 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims, (R. at 325), holding in 
relevant part as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated §58-13-5(7) clearly insulates a hospital from 
negligence claims stemming from credentialing. Section 58-13-5(7) 
provides: "any hospital, other health care entity, or professional 
organization conducting or sponsoring the review [is] immune from 
liability arising from participation in a review of a health care provider's . . 
. "medical competence." The Court holds with Judge Stott in Rosenlund v. 
Mountain View Hospital, Inc. (Ex. A to Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss) that Section 58-13-5(7)'s language is "too 
apparent to be ignored . . . and appears to both contemplate and deny the 
possibility of bringing a negligent credentialing cause of action." 
Additionally, the Court agrees with Defendant and the other district 
courts who have ruled on this issue that Utah Code Annotated § 58-13-4 
also grants immunity to health care facilities for claims such as this by 
immunizing them for many categories of decisions and determinations. 
Finally, the Court is further persuaded that negligent credentialing 
does not exist because of the broad immunity granted to health facilities 
under Utah Code Annotated § 26-25-1. 
June 20, 2008 Ruling and Order of Judge Pat B. Brian, at 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claims 
because: (1) the plain language of U.CA. 1953 §§ 58-13-5, 58-13-4, and 26-25-1 
demonstrate that Utah law does not permit a negligent credentialing cause of action 
against a hospital; (2) the broad immunity against negligent credentialing claims provided 
under these statutory provisions is consistent with the confidentiality provisions set forth 
in U.CA. 1953 § 26-25-3 that apply to *cany legal proceeding of any kind or character"; 
and (3) the immunity provided under U.CA. 1953 §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5 and 26-25-1 does 
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not violate the open courts or equal protection provisions of the Utah Constitution 
because no cause of action for negligent credentialing existed when the immunity statutes 
were enacted; because the immunity statutes and Utah law provide reasonable alternative 
remedies; and because the statutory immunity and confidentiality provisions are a 
reasonable means of encouraging frank, open and candid evaluations of physicians who 
seek the issuance or reissuance of hospital privileges. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT 
CREDENTIALING CLAIM IS BARRED BY UTAH'S HEALTH 
CARE PROVIDERS IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY ACT AND 
UTAH'S CARE REVIEW STATUTE. 
A. The Arguments Of Plaintiff And Her Amicus Ignore the Plain 
Statutory Language Of The Immunity Statutes. 
Plaintiff and her amicus curiae devote most of their briefs to anything but the plain 
and clear language of the Utah statutes on which this case was decided below, and on 
which it must be decided on appeal. Thus, their briefs address automobile and truck 
drivers (PL Br. 4, 5, 13, 14), prior statutes that have been either amended or replaced 
(Am. Br. 6-9,11-14), legal doctrines (e.g. charitable immunity) that no longer exist (PL 
Br. 8, 12), inapplicable Restatement provisions (PL Br. 14, 15), and cases from other 
states that do not have the comprehensive confidentiality and immunity statutes 
pertaining to a hospital's physician credentialing process that are present in Utah (PL Br. 
9, 20-21; Am. Br. 20-23). None of these irrelevant matters discussed by Plaintiff and her 
amicus can change Utah statutory law, which, as four district courts have now held, 
wCclearly insulates the hospital from negligence claims stemming from credentialing" of 
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independent staff physicians who are neither employees nor agents of the hospital, but 
who remain folly responsible for their conduct and subject to liability to any person 
injured by their medical negligence. June 2, 2008 Ruling and Order, at 1. 
As these four district courts have correctly ruled, this immunity grant is reflected 
in a comprehensive statutory scheme in which the Utah legislature sought to encourage 
frank, open, and candid peer review of a physician's competence and other matters 
relating to his or her ability to deliver quality health care and services to hospital patients, 
See Cannon v. Salt Lake Medical Center, 121 P.3d 74, 80 (Utah 2005); Benson by 
Benson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1993). To carry out and further 
this laudable purpose, the statutes prohibit the "discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in 
any legal proceeding of any kind or character" of "all information, interviews, reports, 
statements, memorandums, or other data furnished" to any hospital committee involved 
in any such a physician review process as well as "any findings or conclusions" reached 
as a result of that process. U.C.A. § 26-25-3 (West 2008). By prohibiting these materials 
from discovery, the legislature clearly recognized that ^public policy is best served by 
fostering an atmosphere of professional candor which would be less likely to occur if 
such information were discoverable." June 6, 2006 Order Granting Defendant IHC 
Health Services, Inc's Motion to Dismiss in Martinez v. James Tran, M.D. and IHC 
Health Services Inc., Case No. 050400432, at 3. Consistent with this purpose and broad 
confidentiality grant, the statutes then immunize the individual participants, as well as the 
hospital itself, from any liability claims arising from the deliberations, decisions or 
determinations made as a result of this confidential physician review process or 
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participation therein - unless there is clear and convincing evidence that those involved 
in the process acted with malice and in bad faith. When it amended the immunity 
statutes, the Legislature deliberately ''broadened the immunity language to make it clear 
that it applies equally to hospitals and individuals involved in credentialing and 
privileging doctors and evaluating health care." October 23, 2006 Ruling in Cuno v. G. 
Remington Brooks, M.D., et ai, Case No. 050911340. 
These are sound and sensible legislative enactments. Absent such immunity and 
confidentiality provisions, the goal of the peer review process and the willingness of a 
person to participate in the process could well be jeopardized. Other states with similar 
confidentiality and/or immunity provisions likewise have sensibly held that negligent 
credentialing claims cannot be brought against a hospital. See, Kauntz v. HCA-
Healthcare, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 817-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); St. Luke's Episcopal 
Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W. 2d 503, 505-09 (Tex. 1997); Svindland v. A.l DuPont Hosp., 
2006 WL 3209953, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying Delaware law). As stated in a 
comprehensive law review article, George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: 
Reconciling the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 Ala. L. 
Rev. 723 (2001), u[tjhe immunization of committee members and affiliated institutions 
from liability for their actions or statements performed within the scope and function of a 
peer review committee is an important strength of medical review statutes" and "[i]n 
order for these policy interests to mutually benefit from the existence of these laws, 
courts must broadly apply the privileges and immunities provided by the laws of peer 
review protection." Id. at 730, 742. 
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Nor do the Utah immunity statutes violate any provision of the Utah constitution. 
Indeed, the only legitimate constitutional issues would be those that would arise if the 
Utah statutes at issue were interpreted not to grant immunity for credentialing claims. In 
such a case, the confidentiality provisions of the statute would still prevent the hospital 
from introducing in evidence all of the ''information, interviews, reports, statements, 
memoranda, or other data" on which its credentials committee relied in reaching its 
credentialing decisions - thereby depriving a hospital of its fundamental rights to equal 
protection and due process of the law in defending itself against an action for civil 
damages. See Point I.D., infra. 
This does not mean that hospitals or physicians are immunized from liability for 
their negligent medical care or treatment rendered to any hospital patient. To the 
contrary, the statutes expressly do "not relieve any healthcare provider from liability 
incurred in providing professional care and treatment to any patient." Thus, in the case at 
bar, St. Marks would be liable to Plaintiff for any proven allegation that its agents, 
servants or employees rendered improper medical care to Ms. Archuleta. Likewise, Dr. 
Halversen remains liable for any injuries sustained by Ms. Archuleta as a result of his 
negligence.3 
J
 That liability will be determined pursuant to the valid and enforceable arbitration 
agreement between Plaintiff and Dr. Halversen. (PI. Br. 3). 
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B. This Case Should Be Decided Solely On The Basis Of The Utah 
Immunity Statutes. 
When determining the meaning of a statute, the Court should begin with the 
statutes plain language. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Applying the 
general rules of statutory construction, this Court has stated that its ''primary goal . . . is 
to evince vthe true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain 
language of the Act," Carter v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469 
(Utah 2006), by rendering "all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful" and 
avoiding "interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." 
Id. The Court should "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. We must be guided 
by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to 
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction," Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. 
Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). In such an instance, "no other interpretive tools 
are needed in analyzing the statute." State v. Barrett, 127 P.2d 682 (Utah 2005). "Only 
when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). Because U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4. 
58-13-5, 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 are clear and unambiguous in the immunity/confidentiality 
granted health care providers, including hospitals, with respect to their deliberations, 
decisions and determinations involved in their review of the medical competence of a 
physician providing care to hospital patients, this Court should affirm the ruling of Judge 
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Brian who correctly held (as have three other district courts) that these statutes clearly 
and unambiguously bar any action for negligent credentialing in Utah. 
C. The Plain Language Of §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 Bar Claims For 
Negligent Credentialing. 
The Utah Peer Review Statute, U.C.A. §§ 58-13-1 et seq., and the Care Review 
Statute, U.C.A. §§ 26-25-1 et seq., individually and collectively, make it clear that St. 
Mark's is immunized against Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim. U.C.A. §§ 58-13-
4(2) and 58-13-5(7), state in pertinent part: 
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and 
the organizations or entities sponsoring these activities are immune 
from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or 
determinations made or information furnished in good faith and 
without malice: 
(a) serving on committees: 
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality 
of health care or determine whether provided 
health care was necessary, appropriate, properly 
performed, or provided at a reasonable cost; . . . . 
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees; or 
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this 
Subsection (2) and that are established by any 
hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical 
Association, or one of its component medical societies 
to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or 
the performance of health or hospital services to, 
patients within this state; 
* * * 
(7) An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, 
board, committee, department, medical staff, or professional 
organization of health care providers is, and any hospital, other 
health care entity, or professional organization conducting or 
sponsoring the review, immune from liability arising from 
participation in a review of a health care provider's professional 
ethics, medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse. 
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U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-5(7)(West 2008)(emphasis added). 
By their plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-5(7) grant broad 
immunity to health care providers4, such as St. Mark's Hospital, from liability for its 
participation in activities that constitute the essence of the physician credentialing 
process, i.e., the evaluation and peer review of a physician's "professional ethics, medical 
competence, moral turpitude" and a physician's overall "performance of health or 
hospital services to, patients within this state." See, U.C.A. 1953 §§ 58-13-4(2) and 58-
13-5(7). Such a competence evaluation and review is the core of any credentialing 
decision to issue or renew a physician's hospital privileges, and the statutory immunity 
granted for these activities is "too apparent to be ignored." June 20, 2008 Ruling and 
Order of Judge Brian, at 1 (citing September 21, 2006 Ruling by Judge Gary D. Stott on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in Rosenlund v. Mountain View Hsopital, Inc., Case No. 
030400671). 
Plaintiffs and the Amicus's assertion that these broad immunity grants are limited 
to suits brought by physicians disgruntled by a credentialing decision (PL Br. 17; Am. Br. 
16) is unfounded. No such limitation is expressed or implied. To the contrary, the broad 
statutory immunities granted to credentialing decisions are stated without limitation or 
condition - as long as the decisions are made in good faith and without malice. 
Again, it is the statutory language that controls and Plaintiffs and Amicus's 
attempt to add statutory limitations and conditions that do not exist must be rejected. Neel 
4
 Health care providers are defined to include hospitals. U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-403. 
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v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995) ("We have 'no power to rewrite a statute to make 
it conform to an intention not expressed,"' quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 
633, 640 (Utah 1988)). 
D. The Immunity Provisions in §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 Are Consistent 
With The Immunity and Confidentiality Provisions Found In §§ 26-25-
1 and 26-25-3, 
The immunity provisions found in §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 are consistent with the 
immunity and confidentiality provisions set forth in §§ 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 and further 
support a finding that the immunity statutes individually and collectively bar an action by 
a patient for negligent credentialing. U.C.A. 1953 § 26-25-1 states in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without 
incurring liability, provide the following information to the persons 
and entities described in Subsection (2): 
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records 
appointed under Title 26, Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act; 
(b) interviews; 
(c) reports; 
(d) statements; 
(e) memoranda; 
(f) familial information; and 
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to: 
(a) the department and local health departments; 
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the 
Department of Human Services; 
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with 
institutions of higher education; 
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical 
societies; 
(e) peer review committees; 
(f) professional review organizations; 
(g) professional societies and associations; and 
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(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses 
described in Subsection (3). 
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the 
following purposes: 
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of 
reducing the incidence of disease, morbidity, or mortality; or 
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care 
rendered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers. 
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, 
interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other information 
relating to the ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer 
review committees, professional societies and associations, or any in-
hospital staff committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional 
society or association discipline. 
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result 
of: 
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section; 
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in 
this section to advance health research and health education; or 
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance with 
this chapter. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-25-1 (West 2008)(emphasis added). 
After immunizing from liability all persons who provide information to hospital 
committees, such as credentialing committees, involved in "peer review" and the 
"evaluation and improvement of hospital health care," U.C.A. § 26-25-3 makes clear that 
such information may not be disclosed "in any legal proceeding of any kind." U.C.A. § 
26-25-3, states in pertinent part: 
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data 
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions 
resulting from those studies are privileged communications and are not 
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subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding 
of any kind or character. 
U.C.A. § 26-25-3 (West 2008)(emphasis added). 
If any statutory provision squarely rebukes Plaintiffs claim that the immunity and 
confidentiality provisions in §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1 do not apply to patients' 
suits for negligent credentialing, this is it. Indeed, if Plaintiff s and the Amicus's position 
were accepted, this confidentiality provision would still remain in full force and effect. 
Thus, Plaintiff could not discover and St. Mark's could not reveal, and neither side could 
introduce in evidence, 'information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other 
data" on which St. Mark's relied in issuing privileges to Dr. Halverson.5 Thus, as 
recently recognized by the Colorado Court of Appeals, such a confidentiality provision 
confirms the legislature's intent to bar negligent credentialing claims. 
[I]t would be inconsistent to preclude a patient's discovery of peer review 
documents dealing with an allegedly negligent physician, but still allow 
that patient's negligent credentialing claim to be asserted. If such a claim 
were allowed, both patients and hospitals would be at distinct 
disadvantages in proving their claims or defenses. 
3
 In Benson by Benson v. I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), this Court 
stated that U.C.A. § 26-25-3 precludes the admission in evidence of documents prepared 
specifically to be submitted for review purposes. The Court in Benson noted that U.C.A. 
§ 26-25-3 did not preclude the discovery of any such documents or other information 
pertaining to the review process. Subsequent to Benson, the Legislature amended § 26-
25-3 to state that such documents and other information uare not subject to discovery.v 
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Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). Moreover, 
allowing a negligent credentialing action to proceed in the face of such a prohibition 
against discovery and the receipt into evidence of the very materials on which St. Mark's 
relied in making its credentialing decisions would deprive St. Mark's of the ability to 
defend itself, in plain violation of its constitutional right to due process and equal 
protection under the law. See Utah Constitution Art. I, §§ 7, 24; U.S. Constitution, 
Amendments V, XIV. It is a fundamental proposition of Utah law that "it is the duty of 
this Court to construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever possible. 
[The Court] must wadopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional 
infirmity." State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983). Here, the only 
construction that avoids constitutional infirmities is that which recognizes the clear 
language of the statute and enforces the intended bar against claims for negligent 
credentialing. 
E. Nothing In The Immunity Statutes Bars Claims For Negligent Care 
And Treatment, But This Is Not Such A Claim. 
Although the statutory immunities discussed above bar claims for negligent 
credentialing, the immunity statutes do not prohibit suits "encompassing the whole field 
of negligence law" against a hospital defendant. PL Br. at 19. Indeed, § 58-13-4(3) 
expressly udoes not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing 
professional care and treatment to any patientT U.C.A. § 58-13-4(3)(West 
2008)(emphasis added). As an employer of various medical personnel, including nurses 
and even in some instances physicians, a hospital can still be held liable for the care and 
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treatment of patients by its employees under traditional respondeat superior negligence 
principles. 
Indeed, in the Utah hospital cases cited by Plaintiff (PL Br. 13) as establishing that 
a hospital has a direct and independent responsibility to its patients in its credentialing 
decisions, this is exactly what occurred. See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d 
270 (Utah \992){res ipsa loquitur claims alleging instrument or thing allegedly causing 
injury was in control of physician and/or hospital employees); Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (patient brought suit against physician 
and hospital, alleging in part, negligence on behalf of the hospital's employee nurse); 
George v. LD Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1990) (wrongful death suit alleging failure 
of hospital employee nurse to notify of decedent's deteriorating condition proximate 
cause of death); Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1990) (res ipsa loquitur claims alleging instrument or thing allegedly causing injury was 
in control of physician and/or hospital employees). 
Thus, the fact that a physician's or a hospital's professional care and treatment to a 
patient may be subjected to peer review or other committee review does not immunize 
the physician or the hospital from suits alleging that such professional care and treatment 
was performed in a negligent manner. But this immunity exception has no application 
here. St. Mark's is not sued in this case for "providing professional care and treatment" 
to Plaintiff. Instead, St. Mark's is sued for its credentialing decisions with regard to Dr. 
Halverson prior to the time that Dr. Halverson provided the "professional care and 
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treatment" about which Plaintiff complains and for which Dr. Halversen has no 
immunity. 
II. AFFORDING HOSPITALS IMMUNITY AGAINST CLAIMS FOR 
NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
OPEN COURTS OR EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
When it enacted U.C.A. 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1, immunizing hospitals 
against negligent credentialing claims, the Utah Legislature acted well within the limits 
drawn by the Utah Constitution. Contrary to the contentions in Plaintiffs brief (PI. Br. 
22), neither the open courts clause nor the equal protection provisions of the Utah 
Constitution were violated by the Legislature's enactment of these immunity provisions. 
The Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
This Court has stated that while "the open courts clause protects both substantive 
and procedural rights, the clause is not an absolute guarantee of all substantive rights." 
Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 116 P.3d 295, 300 (Utah 2005). To the 
contrary, the Legislature "has great latitude in defining, changing, and modernizing the 
law, and in doing so may create new rules of law and abrogate old ones." Berry v. Beach 
Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985). Thus, this Court has determined that a 
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given statutory enactment that eliminates or precludes a cause of action will not violate 
the open courts clause if any one of the following three conditions are met: 
1) the statute does not abrogate an existing legal remedy, Wood v. University 
of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436, 442 (Utah 2003); or 
2) the statute provides an effective and reasonable alternative remedy, Berry, 
supra, 717P.2dat680;or 
3) the statute's elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means to achieve the elimination of a social or economic evil, 
Berry, supra, 1X1 P.2d at 680. 
While a statute that satisfies any one of the above tests passes constitutional 
muster, the Utah statutes that immunize hospitals against negligent credentialing claims, 
i.e. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, and 26-25-1, satisfy all three of these tests. 
A. The Open Courts Clause Was Not Violated Because Negligent 
Credentialing Was Not An Existing Cause Of Action At The Time 
U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, 26-25-1, Or 26-25-3 Were Enacted. 
Before the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution is implicated, it must be 
established that the enacted legislation either in whole or in part abrogates an existing 
right of action. Tinley, 116 P.3d at 300; See Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 870-71 (Utah 
1988). In this case, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs "negligent 
credentialing" claim because the Legislature did not eliminate the existing "common law 
causes of action for negligence against a hospital," but rather only "sought to abrogate the 
extended duty" sought to be imposed on hospitals through a negligent credentialing cause 
of action. June 24, 2008 Ruling and Order at p. 1. 
In 2003, this Court addressed the "existing remedy or cause of action" requirement 
in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2003). In Wood, the 
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plaintiffs alleged that the Utah Wrongful Life Act, enacted in 1983, which prohibits 
lawsuits for wrongful birth, violated the open courts clause. In rejecting the plaintiffs 
open courts clause claim, this Court stated that 
"[ijn the absence of a declaration by this court either recognizing, or 
refusing to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature 
set forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be 
recognized in Utah in enacting [the Wrongful Life Act]. As a result, 
regardless of whether such an action was recognized by other states at the 
time, because a cause of action for wrongful birth did not exist in Utah at 
the time the statute was enacted in 1983, the legislature did not abrogate an 
existing legal remedy. In sum, because the statute did not abrogate an 
existing legal remedy, and because the Berry test begins with the 
presumption that a legal remedy was abolished, the legislation satisfies the 
first Berry hurdle. Because we conclude that no existing remedy was 
abrogated, we need not apply the second part of the Berry test." Id. at 443. 
The same reasoning applies here. To the best of St. Mark's research, there is no 
prior declaration by this Court ''either recognizing, or refusing to recognize, a cause of 
action for" negligent credentialing; and Plaintiff cites none. Plaintiff argues Utah has 
"recognized corporate negligence for hospitals" since 1907, and that negligent 
credentialing "simply represents the particular set of facts and circumstances under which 
a hospital may be held liable for failing to exercise due care in selecting and retaining 
competent surgeons." PL Brief at 12, 25. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to 
Gitzhoffen v. Sister of Holy Cross Hosp., 88 P. 691 (Utah 1907) and Sessions v. Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass 'n, 78 P.2d 645 (Utah 1938), for the proposition that Utah 
has acknowledged that a hospital may still be "guilty of negligence in the selection of the 
physician or servant." PL Br. at 11. Plaintiffs reliance on Gitzhoffen and Sessions, is 
misplaced for several reasons. First, and most importantly, neither Gitzhoffen nor 
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Sessions establish that Utah recognizes "corporate negligence" or institutional 
negligence, much less negligent credentialing, as an existing cause of action; On the 
contrary, Gitzhoffen addresses the issues of what evidence is determinative of a hospital's 
status as a charitable organization, and whether the evidence in that trial was sufficient to 
establish the hospital's liability under traditional respondeat superior principles. 
Similarly, Sessions involved an issue of whether the amended complaint sufficiently pled 
facts establishing that the defendant hospital was not a charitable organization entitled to 
immunity from liability for the negligent actions of its employees - also traditional 
respondeat superior negligence principles. Thus, the theory of direct corporate hospital 
negligence or institutional negligence was not involved. 
Moreover, the statements from Gitzhoffen and Sessions, quoted by Plaintiff, refer 
to liability in the selection of an employee physician or servant, not an independent 
contractor physician. Neither Gitzhoffen nor Sessions are examples of instances where 
this Court has imposed administrative or managerial liability on a hospital for the conduct 
of an independent contractor physician. Nor do any other of Plaintiffs cases, e.g., 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), George v. LD Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah 1990) or Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1990) do so. Thus, all the district courts deciding this issue have correctly held that Utah 
law has never previously recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing of an 
independent contractor physician. Therefore, under Wood, the statutes immunizing 
21 
hospitals against negligent credentialing claims do not abrogate an existing legal remedy 
and there is no Open Courts Clause violation for this reason alone.6 
B. The Utah Statutes Immunizing Hospitals From Negligent 
Credentialing Claims Leave Patients With Reasonable Alternative 
Remedies. 
Even in instances where the Legislature abrogates an existing right of action, this 
Court has established the following test for determining whether a legislative enactment 
satisfies the open courts clause: 
[Sjection 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective 
and reasonable alternative remedy uby due course of law" for vindication of 
his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be 
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated . . . 
[I]f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy . . . may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil 
to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985) 
Here, while the immunity statutes at issue do not abrogate an existing right of 
action, they provide Plaintiff with effective and reasonable alternative remedies. Most 
obvious is the alternative remedy of recovering from Dr. Halverson for any injuries cause 
6
 Plaintiff cites cases from Georgia and Ohio, (PI. Br. 21, n.54) as examples of states who 
have interpreted their statutes as not eliminating claims for negligent credentialing. But in 
contrast to Utah, Georgia and Ohio case law had expressly recognized negligent 
credentialing claims. Albainv. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1044-1047 (Ohio 1990); 
Joinerv. Mitchell County Hosp. Autk, 186 S.E.2d 307, 309 (Ga. 1971). 
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by his negligence in providing professional care and treatment to the Plaintiff. As stated 
by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Kauntz v HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2007): 
While patients may not sue hospitals under these circumstances, they 
nevertheless retain the right to sue negligent physicians personally. Thus, 
barring negligent credentialing damage claims in these circumstances does 
not leave a negligently injured patient without a remedy. 
Kauntz, 174 P.3d at 819. 
Furthermore, U.C.A. § 58-13-4(2) states that health care providers are only 
immune from liability with respect to their deliberations, decisions or determinations 
made 4in good faith and without malice." U.C.A. § 58-13-4(2) (West 2008). Thus, the 
immunity from negligent credentialing causes of action provided by U.C.A. § 58-13-4 
and 58-13-5 is not unlimited. A plaintiff may potentially assert a claim for "negligent 
credentialing" where a showing of bad faith and/or malice can be made. Given these two 
alternative remedies, U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 do not leave a negligently injured 
patient without a remedy. 
Finally, even if negligent credentialing was a recognized pre-existing cause of 
action (it is not), and even if the immunity statutes did not provide plaintiff with any 
alternative remedies (they do), there would still be no constitutional violation because the 
immunity statutes serve to create a reasonable, non-arbitrary means to encourage 
hospitals and hospital review committees to engage in full, frank, open and candid 
evaluation and peer review of physicians during the credentialing process. Berry, 1X1 
P.2dat680. 
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C. U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, And 26-25-1 Do Not Violate The Equal 
Protection Clause Of The Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff argues that construing U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5 and 26-25-1 uto 
eliminate negligence claims premised on credentialing while allowing other claims based 
on different bases for negligence," offends the equal protection granted in Article I, 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. PL Br. at 25. Such an equal protection challenge 
fails if the subject legislation "(1) *s reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency 
to further the legislative objective and, in fact, substantially furthers a valid legislative 
purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Judd v. 
Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 141 (Utah 2004). Although the elimination of claims premised 
on credentialing effects a small class of plaintiffs, the immunity provided is: 1) 
reasonable; 2) it substantially furthers the legislative objective of encouraging hospitals 
and hospital review committees to engage in full, frank, open and candid evaluation and 
peer review of physicians during the credentialing process; and 3) it is reasonably 
necessary to further that legislative goal because without it, physicians and other potential 
members of peer review committees would be reluctant to sit on any such committee, 
much less provide open and candid evaluation of their peers for fear of subjecting 
themselves, and/or the hospital itself, to lawsuits premised on their participation and 
credentialing decisions. As this Court stated in Judd, u[w]hen attempting to resolve 
problems of policy, the legislature is inevitably forced to draw lines." Judd, 103 P.3d at 
143. While the immunity statutes prevent Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim, it "is 
a policy choice made by the legislative branch" and their purpose in doing so is a valid 
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and legitimate one. Because the immunity bar is a reasonably necessary means of 
achieving the legislative purpose of encouraging open, frank and candid peer review 
without the fear of retribution and lawsuits, and it actually and substantially furthers that 
purpose, it is permissible under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the immunity and confidentiality provisions set forth in 
U.C.A. §§ 58-13-4, 58-13-5, 26-25-1 and 26-25-3 represent a comprehensive and 
constitutional statutory scheme in which the Utah Legislature sought to improve 
healthcare within the State by encouraging hospitals and hospital peer review committees 
to engage in full, frank, open and candid evaluation of physicians' competence and other 
matters during credentialing proceedings. The district court correctly applied these 
statutory immunity provisions in holding that Utah law does not recognize a cause of 
action for "negligent credentialing." Accordingly, this Court should affirm the ruling of 
the Third Judicial District Court granting Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp., 
d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent 
Credentialing, finding that as a matter of law, Utah does not recognize claims for 
negligent credentialing. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Section 58-13-4 Page 1 ot 1 
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58-13-4. Liability immunity for health care providers on committees - Evaluating 
and approving medical care. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as in Section 78B-
3-403 
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the organizations or entities 
sponsoring these activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or 
determinations made or information furnished in good faith and without malice: 
(a) serving on committees: 
(i) established to determine if hospitals and long-term care facilities are being used 
properly; 
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or determine whether 
provided health care was necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at a 
reasonable cost; 
(iii) functioning under Pub. L. No. 89-97 or as professional standards review organizations 
under Pub. L. No. 92-603; 
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees, or 
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this Subsection (2) and that are established by 
any hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical Association, or one of its component 
medical societies to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of 
health or hospital services to, patients within this state; 
(b) members of licensing boards established under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, 
to license and regulate health care providers; and 
(c) health care providers or other persons furnishing information to those committees, as 
required by law, voluntarily, or upon official request. 
(3) This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing 
professional care and treatment to any patient. 
(4) Health care providers serving on committees or providing information described in this 
section are presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice, absent clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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58-13-5. Information relating to adequacy and quality of medical care -- Immunity 
from liability. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as defined in 
Section 78B-3-403. 
(2) (a) The division, and the boards within the division that act regarding the health care 
providers defined in this section, shall adopt rules to establish procedures to obtain information 
concerning the quality and adequacy of health care rendered to patients by those health care 
providers. 
(b) It is the duty of an individual licensed under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, as a 
health care provider to furnish information known to him with respect to health care rendered to 
patients by any health care provider licensed under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, as 
the division or a board may request during the course of the performance of its duties. 
(3) A health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which employs, grants privileges to, 
or otherwise permits a licensed health care provider to engage in licensed practice within the 
health care facility, and any professional society of licensed health care providers, shall report 
any of the following events in writing to the division within sixty days after the event occurs 
regarding the licensed health care provider: 
(a) terminating employment of an employee for cause related to the employee's practice as 
a licensed health care provider; 
(b) terminating or restricting privileges for cause to engage in any act or practice related to 
practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(c) terminating, suspending, or restricting membership or privileges associated with 
membership in a professional association for acts of unprofessional, unlawful, incompetent, or 
negligent conduct related to practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(d) subjecting a licensed health care provider to disciplinary action for a period of more than 
30 days; 
(e) a finding that a licensed health care provider has violated professional standards or 
ethics; 
(f) a finding of incompetence in practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(g) a finding of acts of moral turpitude by a licensed health care provider; or 
(h) a finding that a licensed health care provider is engaged in abuse of alcohol or drugs. 
(4) This section does not prohibit any action by a health care facility, or professional society 
comprised primarily of licensed health care providers to suspend, restrict, or revoke the 
employment, privileges, or membership of a health care provider. 
(5) The data and information obtained in accordance with this section is classified as a 
"protected" record under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management 
Act. 
(6) (a) Any person or organization furnishing information in accordance with this section in 
response to the request of the division or a board, or voluntarily, is immune from liability with 
respect to information provided in good faith and without malice, which good faith and lack of 
malice is presumed to exist absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
(b) The members of the board are immune from liability for any decisions made or actions 
taken in response to information acquired by the board if those decisions or actions are made 
in good faith and without malice, which good faith and lack of malice is presumed to exist 
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
(7) An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board, committee, 
department, medical staff, or professional organization of health care providers is, and any 
http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE58/htm/58_13_000500.htm 12/23/2008 
Utah Code Section 58-13-5 Page 2 of2 
hospital, other health care entity, or professional organization conducting or sponsoring the 
review, immune from liability arising from participation in a review of a health care provider's 
professional ethics, medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse. 
(8) This section does not exempt a person licensed under Title 58, Occupations and 
Professions, from complying with any reporting requirements established under state or federal 
law. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of persons to 
designated agencies - Immunity from liability. 
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring liability, provide 
the following information to the persons and entities described in Subsection (2): 
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Title 26, 
Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act; 
(b) interviews; 
(c) reports; 
(d) statements; 
(e) memoranda; 
(f) familial information; and 
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to: 
(a) the department and local health departments; 
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the Department of Human 
Services; 
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institutions of higher 
education; 
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies; 
(e) peer review committees; 
(f) professional review organizations; 
(g) professional societies and associations; and 
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described in Subsection (3). 
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the following purposes: 
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of reducing the incidence of 
disease, morbidity, or mortality; or 
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by hospitals, 
health facilities, or health care providers. 
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, interviews, reports, 
statements, memoranda, or other information relating to the ethical conduct of any health care 
provider to peer review committees, professional societies and associations, or any in-hospital 
staff committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline. 
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of: 
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section; 
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in this section to 
advance health research and health education; or 
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance with this chapter. 
(6) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set forth in Section 78B-3-403; and 
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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26-25-3. Information considered privileged communications. 
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data furnished by 
reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are 
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any 
legal proceeding of any kind or character. 
Amended by Chapter 201, 1996 General Session 
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Addendum B 
Laity R. White (3446) 
Paul D, Van Komen (7332) 
BURJHDtB&WIOTE 
Attorneys for IFIC Health Services, Inc, 
1400 Key BanlcTowtf 
50 South Main Street 
Sjilt Lake City, UTS4144 
Telephone: (801>3$p*7000 
FiLED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PETE MARTINEZ and RITA MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES TRAN, M.D. md mc HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC., 
Defendants, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT fflC 
HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No, 050400432 MP 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 4 
This matter cauie before the Court on May 17,2006 for hearing on defendant H C Health 
Services, Inc OHC") Motion to Dismiss, dated Mer&h 20> 2006. At the hearing, Paul D, Van 
Krnnen of Burbidge & White represented JHQ Scott A. DuBofc of Snell & Wllmer represented 
Dr. Jaraes Tran; md Cladc Nowhall of LAW Office* afClaxk NwfcaU represented the plaintiffs. 
Having:heard oral argument from counsel, and having considered the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, and being fully advised In the premises, the Ciourt finds merit in JHC's 
arguments regarding the plaintiffs' only cause of action against IHC, the third cemae of action of 
the complaint titled 'Negligent Supervision, Credentialing and PrivUeging-IHC Health Services, 
Inc,*' 
The Court finds (hat by enacting Utah's health om and peer review statute, Utah Code 
Ann,§ 26-25-1 ot seq,, the legislatuxe has specified that any information and materials relating to 
health care review and peer review are not discoverable, and cannot be used or admitted as 
evidence in any legal proceeding. The legislature's intent appears to be broad and sweeping 
based on (he statutory language that the privilege pertains to information including interviews/7 
'tepartE," "statements," itiucmorandn'7 and "other data relating to th£ condition wd treatment of 
any person" that i$ utilized in "the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care 
rendered by hospitals, health fhclHties, or health care providers," Utah Code Ana § 26-25-1, 
The supervision, credentialing and privileging of a physician comes within this broad privilege 
and the exclusion of$ucb privileged information from discovery and receipt into evidence, 
Furthermore, Utah Code Amu § 58-134 grants wwmisty to health care providers, such 
as IHC, against the type of claims found in the plaintiffs' third cause of action for negligent 
supervision, credentialing and privileging* Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5 fclso providoe immunity to 
this Defendant from liability in reviewing a care provider's medical competence such as Dr. 
Trap, 
An individual who is a member of a hospital administration^ board, 
committee, department, medical sbrff, ox professional organization 
of health care providers is, and any hospital, cihtr health care 
entity, or professional organization conducting- or sponsoring the 
*2-
review, immune from Habilityorisfug from participation ID p 
revive of a health c^re provider's professional ettucgKrnM<G?l 
ponty^fepce, moral turpitude, or substance abuse, 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5(7) (emphasis added). 
The legislative protection of the supervision, credcntialiag and privileging process is an 
important element in enabling health cere provider* like IHC and those who participate in such 
processes to evaluate md improve the quality of care provided The Utah legislature determined 
thai this information is protected torn discovery and that health cere providers are immune from 
liability for conducting such activities. This determination recognizee that publio policy is best 
semd by fostering an atmosphere of profession^ candor which would be less likely to ooour if 
such information were discoverable, Because the legislature has granted broad immunity for 
such activities, plaintiffs' third cause of Ration fails as a matter of law. 
For these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in the memoranda of defendant IHC, the 
Court finds that die plaintiffs* third cause of action for negligent supervision, credentialing and 
privileging against IHC Health Sendees, lap should be dismissed, 
Therefore, IT IS HERBBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant, 
IHC Health Services, Inc/s Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs' third cause of action, which is 
plaintiff only cause of action against IHC Health Services, Inc., should be and the some IS 
HEREBY GRANTED, and the third causa of action of plaintiffs' complaint IS DISMISSED, 
-3-
WIrHo^rrFRE]UB.cE.Ttep.»i».lf f I».y.«*«-««toC»"^,0™en'1,h6 i^°o^pW°, 
b „ t a t a U b c K q « . o « » « . o * r * c . » o f ^ . 8 « ' H C H ^ Ser ine . 
DATED this j&_ day of 
-4-
Fe irthJuau.i'^i&^ctC 
otuianC «nty, State 01 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^-;Z/^4L!£^— 
Kevin Rosenlund and Diane Rosenlund,, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Mountain View Hospital, Inc., 
Defendant,. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 030400671 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
RULING 
Defendant, Mountain View Hospital, Inc., through a Motion to Dismiss asks the court to 
dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action for negligent credentialing with prejudice Mountain View 
Hospital also asked to be dismissed as a Defendant in the matter. 
This matter came before the court for oral argument on September 20, 2006. After 
reviewing the submitted memorandum, oral arguments, and applicable law, the court grants 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss finding that no negligent credentialing cause of action exists in 
Utah, and thereby dismissing Mountain View Hospital as a Defendant. 
Factual Summary 
On October 31, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, containing Claim IV 
entitled "NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION VERSUS MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL, 
INC." This claim alleges that Defendant's negligently recruited, hired, and retained Doctor Max 
Cannon Plaintiffs do not allege that the hospital nurses or employees committed any negligent 
act during or after the procedure that resulted in Plaintiffs claimed injuries.1 
Analysis 
The question presented by the parties is whether Utah recognizes negligent credentialing 
as a cause of action. Based on present legislative enactments and the lack of any existing 
appellate court decisions this court does not recognize Plaintiffs negligent credentialing claim. If 
the claim asserted against the hospital is to be recognized in this state, it will be under the 
approval of a body other than this court. 
This court believes that claims for negligent credentialing are separate and distinct from 
ordinary negligence claims and do not exist in common law or by statute in Utah. As to the 
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 I11.2d 326, 211, N.E.2d 253 (1965) 
case relied on by Plaintiffs, the decision is the seminal case on negligent credentialing in Illinois 
because it was the first case in Illinois to recognize such a claim. I do not believe Darling is the 
law in Utah nor is its opinion binding or persuasive on this court. 
Defendant rightly relies on statutory language that appears to foreclose the negligent 
credentialing cause of action. Utah Code Annotated § 58-13-4 which grants immunity to health 
care providers, such as Mountain View Hospital, manifests the legislatures intention to abrogate 
negligent credentialing claims. Additionally, this court is persuaded by § 58-13-5(7) which 
notes 
An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board, 
committee, department, medical staff, or professional organization of health care 
providers is, and any hospital, other health care entity, or professional 
organization conducting or sponsoring the review, immune from liability arising 
from participation in a review of a health care provider's professional ethics, 
medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse, (emphasis added). 
1Plaintiff's Complaint, October 31, 2001 at 6. 
This court finds the statutory language in § 58 13 5(7) too apparent to be ignored By 
immunizing conduct concerning participation in a review of a health care providers professional 
ethics, this statute appears to both contemplate and deny the possibility of bringing a negligent 
credentiahng cause of action 
This court therefore grants the Motion and dismisses Plaintiffs negligent credentiahng 
claim with prejudice In as much as this claim is the only allegation of negligence against 
Mountain View Hospital the court also dismisses Mountain View Hospital as a Defendant 
Counsel for Defendant shall prepare the appropriate order for the court to sign forthwith 
DATED this %j day of September, 2006 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
I 
STEVEN J. CUNQ,etaL, | 
I RULING 
Plaintiffs, j 
vs. | 
G. REMINGTON BROOKS, M.D., et | Case No. Q.5Q9I0HO 
a/., I 
| Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
Defendants, | 
! 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Alta View Hospital's Motion 
to Dismiss Claims of Negligent Credentialing and Evaluation came on for hearing on October 4, 
2006. Roger Sharp appeared on behalf of plaintiffs; Brinton Burbidge and Patrick Tanner appeared 
on behalf of defendant EHC Health Services, Inc., dba Alta View Hospital. Now, having heard the 
arguments of counsel and reviewed the parties' written submissions, and for the reasons set forth 
below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss1 and denies the motion to compel. 
Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint "includes a claim thu -,lta View was negligent in 
credentialing, privileging and evaluating care related" to defend- ;• G Remington Brooks, M.D. 
Memorandum in Support, p. 2. Alta View argues, quite correctly, that the plain language of the 
Health Care Providers Immunity from Liability Act (Utah Code Ann. 58-13-1, etseq.}2 immunizes 
it from liability on such a claim. 
(In support of its motion to dismiss, Alta View has submitted the Affidavit of William L. 
Hamilton, M.D., and the Supplemental Affidavit of William L. Hamilton, M,D. Therefore, and pursuant 
to Utah R. Ctv. P. 12(b), the Court treats the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. 
"The pertinent sections are 58-1 3-4(2) and 58-1 3-5(7). They provide as follows: 
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the 
organizations or entities sponsoring these activities are immune from 
liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or determinations made 
or information furnished in good faith and without malice: 
(a) serving on committees; 
(\\) established to evaluate and improve the quality of 
health cure or determine whether provided health care was 
necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at 
reasonable cost; . . . . 
* * * 
(7) (AJ. . . hospital [is] . . . immune from liability arising from 
participation in a review of a health care provider's professional ethics, 
medical competence, moral turpitude, or substance abuse. 
Plaintiffs contend that Article f, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the "Open Courts 
provision1') and Rees v Iniermounlain Health Care, Inc, 808 P 2d 1069 (Utah 1991), require a 
different result This is not the case First, the Open Courts provision "is not implicated because 
there is no abrogation of an existing claim " Reply Memorandum in Support, p. 2 And second the 
Rees decision is easily distinguishable 
In Rees the Utah Supreme Court held that the predecessor to Sections 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-
5(7) was "inapplicable" to a cause of action arising out of a hospital's decision to terminate a 
doctor's privileges "without acontractual due process hearing.1' Rees, 808 P.2d at I078. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court noted that "the immunity statute applied only to individuals, not hospitals." 
Id. It further noted that the statute was not even in effect at the operative time and that its plain 
language indicated that its purpose was "to protect health care providers who furnish information 
regarding the quality of health care rendered by any individual or facility." Id 
None of these factors exist here. This case is a malpractice action. The statutory provisions 
were in place at the time of the alleged malpractice. And the legislature has broadened the immunity 
language to make it clear that it applies equally to hospitals and individuals involved in credentialing 
and privileging doctors and evaluating health care. 
As a consequence, the Court holds that Alta view is, as a matter of law, immune from 
liability on plaintiffs' negligent credentialing and evaluation claim. Th 'vision requires that the 
Court deny the motion to compel, too. 
DATED this ^ " d a y of October, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
